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1. Introduction
Brazil is one ofthe largest countries in the world, with avery
favourable endownmentofnatural resources, and apopulation
of 150 million people. The total personal wealth is estimated to
be over US$ 1 300 billion, whereas the mineral reserves at
Amazonia are worth more than US$ 2 000billion. The country’s
landareais nearly twice that of Europe and the gross national
product ofUS$ 380 billion is the tenth largest GNPinthe world
(equivalentto the total GNP of Sweden, Denmark and Norway).
Since the country’s discovery in 1500, Brazil has had avery
high degree of insertion into the world economy. The Brazilian
economic growth from the XVIth century upto the beginningof
the XXth was characterized by the expansion and contraction
ofboth production and export ofprimary commodities. During
the XXth century, the country hadrelatively high growth rates
on the basis of import-substitution industrialization.
Transnational enterprises had a bearing on this model of
industrialization. Asa matteroffact, the Brazilianeconomyhas
one ofthe highest degrees ofinternationalization ofproduction- transnational enterprises have played a major role in thecountry.





over the Brazilian society. Itwas during the military regime that
transnational enterprises were able to penetrate even further
into the Brazilian economic system.
Unfortunately, Brazil is also well-known forhaving one ofthemostunjustsocieties in theworld. The opportunities forincomeand employment have always been limited. The situation ofhuman deprivationin Brazil is quite astonishing. The accesstohealth, education, housing, safe water and sanitation is very
limited. Thereare millions ofmal-nourishedchildren, as well as
millions of children without access to school and hundreds of
thousands of children dying every year of hunger, disease,malnutrition and physical violence. Meeting the basic humanneedsis still very far-away in Brazil.
Despite the formal democracy and political freedom whichexistsince 1985,afterthe end ofthe military regime, the humanrights for a large majority of the Brazilian population arestillviolated day to day. Indeed, rights are very much unevenly
distributed and are strongly related to the level of income and
wealth. There are no social mechanisms assuring the dignity ofthe human person.In Brazil the “market system”also applies
shamelessly to the rights, dignity and development of the
humanperson.As farashuman developmentis concerned, onefinds the tyranny of a perverted version of the free-market
principle that “get-the-prices-right-and-development-wj]]-
follow’!
Furthermore, Brazil has oneofthe largest degrees ofincome
andwealth concentrationintheworld. Indeed,Brazil shows thegreatest incomedisparity in the worldifone takes into accountthe ratio of the per capita incomeof the richest 20% to the
poorest 20%: in Brazil this ratio is 26, whereas in the United
States and Swedenthe incomeratios are 9 and 5 respectively!
Also, the lowest 40% ofhouseholds has a per capita income
ofUS$ 350- it implies that 60 million people in Brazil have an
average incomesimilar to that of the poorest countries ofAsia
(Pakistan), Central America and the Caribbean (Haiti) and
Africa (Burkina Faso).It is also worth notingthat the Tichest 1%
of the Brazilian population accounts for aproximately 20% of
income and more than 50% of total wealth: in developed
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countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom,
the richest 1% account for 8% of income and about 25% of
wealth’. As regards income and wealth disparities the evidence
is conclusive: Brazil is a “champion”, and it surpassed even the
poorest countries of Central America and the Caribbean, Asia
and ‘frica.
The adjustment process, as a result of the external debt
crisis, has systematically failed under both the military and the
civilian regime. The Brazilian economy ismuchmorevulnerable
and the social fabric is much more deteriorated a decade after
the beginningofthe debtcrisis in 1982. Moreover, the adjustment
process and the “market-oriented” reforms implemented by the
Colloradministration since 1990 are creating
a
criticaleconomic,
social, and political situation in Brazil. In Latin America, the
recent experience ofcountries like Venezuela e Peru show that
strong liberal measures, withoutsocial safeguards, may be a
menace to democracy.
The main concern ofthis studyis to analysethe evolutionof
the Brazilian economyintherecentpastonthe basis ofthe links
between the military establishment, the process of external
indebtedness, and the presence of transnational enterprises.
As a matterof fact, these links have a determinant bearing on
the dynamics of the Brazilian society and economy. Although
the emphasisislaid on economic issues and, mostly, on the role
oftransnational enterprises, the analysis deals with explaining
factors at three basiclevels, namely, the military-strategic, the
political and the economiclevels®.
The paperproceedsin the following way.In thefirst section,
after this Introduction,there is a discussion ofthe strategic and
geopolitical projects or visions of the Brazilian military, which
are at the rootofthe process ofexternal indebtedness in Brazil.Here, one tries to show that the debt crisis and mili
initiatives (strategic and economic alike) are Closely linked. Inthe second section, one deals specifically with the j
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favourable attitude vis-a-vis foreign enterprises in the contextular process of Capitalist economic growth. The lastsectioae Presents a summary of the main conclusions of the
2. The Brazilian Military and Foreign Indebtedness
; establishment has aview aboutits rolIn societywhichenvolves astrongbiastowards“state security”
the adjustment
2.1. .From “great power”to “great ambivalence”
intent to builq up the Brazilian military establishmenthastheas a “greatpower”h great power”. The military vision of Brazilatranscontinental ave cither an international, ora regional, oropinion within the milie: Notwithstanding majordifferences ofmost pragmatic mil; ‘stablishment, it seems that theof geopolitical consideraees Understandthat, on the binternat onal aren ‘rations, Brazil has a role to l "in theAccording to this vw as a regional or intermedi ate owenAfrican Cone ans ew, the Southern Atlant lat€ p er.one an South America are Braail ¢, the Southern
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which is a necessary condition for the “status” ofintermediate
power. Hence, the military establishment has played a major
role as supporter of economic policies oriented to the creation
ofstrategic industries and sectors.This is true, for instance, in
the cases ofthe steel industry, and oil production and refining
during the 1940’s and 1950's, the petrochemical industry, the
capitalgoods industry, the electronic complex, the aeronautical
and armamentindustrysince the 1970's.The projectofbuilding
up a nuclear capability which started in the 1970's was, of
course, a military initiative oriented much more to the external
security concerns than to the domestic supply of energy.
While it is true that the Brazilian military has been closely
associated with economic nationalism,it is probably even truer
that the military has an ambivalentattitude towards foreign
capitaland technology.This “greatambivalence”ischaracterized,
on the one hand,bythe fact thatthe military fears the economic
penetration by transnational enterprises, mostly from the
United States, which is the secular hegemonic power in the
region. National defence implies inter alia the existence of key
economic sectors as well as internal control over strategic
industries (including, arms production), which allow Brazil to
have a “dissuasive capability”. On the other hand, there has
always been feeling that the building up of a strong domestic
economy depends onforeign capital and tecnology.
Duringthe militaryregime (1964-1985) therewasapermanent
conflictbetween differentfractions ofthe militaryestablishment
regarding economic nationalism. Notwithstandingthis conflict,
the “internationalists” were the hegemonic force among the
Brazilian military. The fact is that transnational enterprises
have played a majorrole in the different economic phases ofthe
military regime, namely, the stabilization period (1964-67), the
“miracle” phase (1968-73), the structural adjustment period
(1974-79), and the “lost decade” (1980 onwards).
As far as the debt crisis is concerned, the main external
determinants are the following: the deterioration ofthe terms of
trade (because of the oil crises in 1974 and 1979 and the
reduction of the prices of primary commodities); the sharp
increase of international interest rates in 1980 (because of
9
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changesin the US monetary policy); the increase ofprotectionist
non-tariff measures in developed countries; the oversupply of
international financial flows up to 1982; and the sharp drop of
external financing from 1982 onwards. In the internal front,
however, the debtcrisis hasits roots in the proper nature ofthe
structuraland adjustment processes implemented mos
tly during
hte military regime (thatis, until 1985).
2.2. Military spending and foreign debt
In developing countries the military establishment h
as had
a major responsibility in the external debtcrisis.In this
regard,
the basic mechanismsarethefollowing: “military expenditures
- public deficit - external indebtedness”; and “military
expenditures - arms imports - external indebtedness”.
With respectto Brazil, the basic argumentis that the military
establishmenthasamajor responsibilityregardingthe country’
s
external indebtednessafterthefirst oil shock in 1974. It should
be emphasized, however, that the responsibility ofthe Brazilia
n
military is due not so muchto the levels ofmilitary expenditures
and imports, but mainly to the nature of the adjustment
processcarried out during the military regime.Itis by no means
trueto suggestthat military expenditureshad aminorinfluence.
However,of foremost importanceis the fact, usually neglected
in the debate, that the structural reforms and adjustment
processweresubjectto the militaryviews aboutBrazil's security
andits role in the international arena.
As regards to military expenditures,it is worth noting that
Brazil has a different pattern from that usually found in most
developing countries.Firstly, military expenditures accounted
for 1.2% of Brazil's gross domestic product in 1989 and
approximately 4% of government budget. There seems to have
been no majorfluctuations in these shares since the earl 1970
inasmuchasthey fluctuated around 1%°,It is worth Y i
that, in 1989 the average shareof military expendity Noting
for industrial countries and developing countrie Tes in GDP
4.6% respectively®. S were 4.9% e
10
TheBrazilian Military, Foreign Indebtedness and Transnational Enterprises
Secondly, arms imports represent a relatively small fraction
of total imports (less than 1%) and about 8% oftotal mili
expenditures in Brazil’. There is no doubtthat the existence of
a national armament industry oriented to the production
conventional arms and equipmentsis a major determinant of
this low importratio of the Brazilian armedforces. In 1969 the
Brazilian arms industry had a take-offwith the set up ofastate-
ownedenterprise (Embraer) by theAir Force Ministry to produce
jet fighters and civil airplanes. In 1975 the Army created
another state-owned enterprise (Imbel), which allowed the
Army to have a major influence on the arms industry through
R&D, coordination and planning activities, as well as arms
production and exports. By the mid-1970s there was a
production spurt of armsoriented to a large extent to export
markets. Although Brazil accounts for approximately 1% of
world arms production, it has a relatively diversified arms
industry and it was already the largest arms exporter among
developing countries by the early 1980s°.
Thirdly, Brazil is a net exporter ofmilitary equipment. Rough
estimates indicate that Brazil exported US$ 2.4 billion and
imported US$1 billion in the period 1977-85;thatis, an annual
average trade balance ofUS$ 160 million®. However,it does not
mean thatmilitary activities have no significant impacton the
trade balance.In this regard,it is worth noting that since 1975
the nuclear programme, which cost approximately US$ 7
billion, seems to have had a non-negligible impact on the tradebalance’,
Lastly, total imports of armaments represented less than 1%
of the change ofexternal debt in the recent past'!. However, itshould be takeninto accounttheeffect ofarms production andmilitary expenditures on the external debt service.
nuce this regard, it is worthwhile discussing the costs of theIt ‘clear programme whichwere financed by foreign borrowing.is likely that the annual external debt service of the nuclearProgram ili iees2 me cost a few hundreds million dollars s nce the mid-
It is notevaluateHee because of the lack of information, to
Overall impactof the nuclear programme, in terms
11
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of its effects not only on the trade balance, bul also on the
external debt service. To illustrate, for each billion dollar of
foreign debt associated with the nuclear programmethe annual
average cost during the 1980s was about US$ 170 million’.
This cost is equivalent to the average trade balance of arms
exports and imports mentioned above. Assumingthat the value
mentioned above (US$ billion) is correct and thathalf of this
value involved foreign exchange expenditures, one may say that
the foreign debt service associated with the nuclear programme
cost more than US$ 500 million every year during the past
decade. Consequently, as regards the cost of the nuclear
programmme, in terms of foreign exchange used to import
equipment and to pay the external debt service (nuclear
programmeplusforeign loans for the arms industry) between
the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s,it is likely to have been
several times greater than the trade balance brought about by
conventional arms exports and imports.
Moreover,it is worth noting a second aspect, whichis related
to the debt service of the loans obtained abroadto finance the
expansion of the domestic arms industry. To illustrate,
EMBRAERhada total debt in foreign currency of US$ 260
million in 1988,aswell as the other leading arms producers had
high levels ofindebtedness due probablyto foreign borrowing',
Onthebasisofthe above considerations,it can be said that,
although Brazil is a net exporter of armaments, the overall
impact ofmilitary expenditures on the balance of paymentsis
likely to be negative. In this regard, a particularly important
reason relates to the burden of the foreign debt, mostly from
1975 upto the debt crisis in 1982, associated with the financing
ofthe nuclearprogrammeand the expansion ofarms production
andexports. Notwithstandingthefact that military expenditures
played a non-neglible role in the process of external-accounts
disequilibrium in Brazil, it is important to point out that, in
termsof relative importance,this role cannot be compared to
the overwhelminginfluenceof the deterioration of the termsof
trade and the increase of international interest Tates". Thus
military spending was the handmaidenofthe debt Crisis, ,
12
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2.3. From “national security” to “unlimited vulnerability”
Indeed,as far as the responsibility of the Brazilian military
is concerned, the fundamental point is not so much the overall
balance-of-payments impactof military expenditures, but the
nature of the adjustment process and structural reforms
implemented underthe military regime. Moreover, a particularly
significant issue is the major role played by strategic-military
considerations in the adjustmentprocess.
Accordingto the military view of Brazil as either a “great” or
an “intermediate” power, the principal strategic element of the
adjustment process after 1974 was to reduce the external
dependence and vulnerability of the country.
The adjustmentstrategywasbased onan import-substitution
model, supported by export expansion (including, armaments),
and an increasing inflow of foreign financial resources". The
objective was to keep the economy growing and, at the same
time, to implement somestructural changesatthelevelof the
productive system (mostly related to the domestic production of
capital goods, key intermediate products and energy). Hence,
the adjustmentstrategy followed theline of least resistancein
so far as it drove the economy into the natural path of
industrialisation in Brazil, mainly, import susbstitution in
capital goods.
However, the strategy carried out by the military regimeafter
the first external shock in 1974 implied a greater interaction
with an increasingly volatile international economy, rather
than lower dependence and vulnerability, as intended by the
decisionmakers, military and technocrats alike. The strategy
implied greater reliance on international economic relationsbecause of the roles played by exports, importedoil, foreigntechnology,foreign direct investment and external financing.
It is worth noting in this connection thatthe trade balancebecame Srowingly dependent on the growth of manufacturedexports in an increasingly protectionist world. By the early
aren: the non-tariff measures applied by industrial countriescted more than one-fifth of Brazilian export products'*.
13
Textos para DiscussdGo
Moreover, the structural changes in the energy sector were
oriented to maintain a transport system highly dependent on
imported oil. The import-substitution process in basic inputs
and capital goods was also highly dependent on foreign
technologyand capital, through “jointventures” and expansion
of subsidiaries of transnational corporations. A lower
vulnerability with respect to capital goods and inputs was
followed by an even greater dependence on transnational
enterprises because oftheir operationsin strategic sectors and
technology-intensive industries. This last issue is dealt with in
greater detail in the next section.
Offoremost importanceisthe greaterdependence onfloating
interest rates, so thatby the end of 1979 approximately 70 per
cent of the external debt was related to financial: loans from
commercial banks. In this regard, the Brazilian military and
technocrats also followed theline ofleast resistance inasmuch
as there was
a
relatively elastic supply ofexternal loans, which
wasbroughtaboutbythe recycling ofthe petro-dollars through
the international financial system.
The substantial increase in foreign indebtedness was a
noteworthy aspectofthe period 1974-82, and the assumption
of the decisionmakers was that the external debt could be
rolled- over forever. Hence, itwould be possible to get long-term
loans from commercialbanks andthe costoffinancing could be
diluted over time. Of course, the financing of the adjustment
process depended uponthe performanceofthe world economy
and, by that time, there seemedto exist a certain optimism in
the sense that the world economiccrisis was assumedto bea
temporary and cyclical one. As far as the Brazilian mili
establishmentis concerned, it is worth noting the lack ofa
“contingency plan” to deal the increasing uncertainty of the
international economic system by the mid-1970s onwards}
By the end of the structural reforms in 1979, Brazil was
facing strong balance-of-payments disequilibria on accountof
a cumulative process of indebtedness, and the debt servicebecamethe central issue for economic policy management. The
rise ofinternational interest rates in 1979 was anew important
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there occurred a sharp deterioration of the terms of trade due
not only to the second oil shock, but also to the prices of
commodities. Indeed, there was asharp deterioration ofBrazil's
termsoftrade between the early 1970s and 1982, when the debt
crisis started’’. This crisis implies inter alia that the external
indebtedness processfeeds uponitself and, therefore, the new
loansare basicallyused to pay the debtservice. Besides,itis the
beginning of a process of net transfers of resources from
indebted developing countries to industrial countries. Since
1982, Brazil's interest payments on external debt has been
aboutUS$ 110 billion, thatis, the approximatevalue ofthe debt
outstanding by 1992.
With the debt crisis it became evident that a longer-term
perspective related to developmentwasgraduallyloosingground
to the critical short-term problems of macroeconomic
stabilization. The past decade,after the beginningof the debt
crisis, has been characterized by a series of unsuccessful
attempts to deal with the external debt service. In Brazil this
phenomenon cametogether with the accelerating inflationary
process,in the context of an increasingly unstable, vulnerable
and decaying economic andsocial situation.
At this juncture, the main questionis: Why the Brazilian
military and technocrats carried out structural changes and
policy reformsthat, after all is said and done, implied opposite
results from those they expected?
The answeris that they could not go beyond the limitedinterests of the dominant economic andsocial groups in theBrazilian society. There is no doubtthatthe lackofademocratic
Brazilian military.
In this regard, afterthefirst oil shockthe Brazilian eliteswerefaced with a “wrong question”, namely, “To grow or not togrow?” . Their choice wasto have the economy growingbased onexternal financing. However, by that time the appropriatequestion to be posed was the following: “What significantstructural changes should be made not only to make the
15
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economy more resistant to external shocks, but also to reduce
the internal social and economic disequilibria?”
In other words,it was not only a mattter of reducing trade
vulnerabilities. Muchmore importantthan that, itwas the need
to reduce the “internal vulnerabilities”. But, it would imply a
Significant change of the distribution of income, wealth and
powerin Brazil.
To conclude, the Brazilian society is still suffering from the
failure of the adjustment strategy and structural reforms
' implemented underthe military regime, in the period previous
to the upsurgenceofthe debtcrisisin 1982. The mainexplanation
is that, under an authoritarian regime, there was a natural
convergenceof“the all-consumingdesire for profit” ofthe large
economic groups in Brazil, national and transnational alike,
and “the all-overwhelmingdesire for national security “ of the
Brazilian military (of course, with the amicable help of the
technocracy).
The strategy of the Brazilian military backfired and since
1980 the per capita income in Brazil has been reduced by
approximately 10%. There continuesto exist the long-standing
incapacityofthe Brazilian elites (underthe military regime until]
1985, and the civil regime since then) to Carry out effectivestructural changes, which are the necessary conditions fordealingwith the macroeconomic stabilization problems,as wellas to implementa “people-centred adjustment”,
3. Transnational Corporations in Brazil
In the past decade there have been some important changesin the world regarding economicrelations and ideas. The “newconventional wisdom” envolves an almost absolutepredominanceof “free market” principles and values. In thisregard, there are reasons for worrying about the apparenttriumph ofmarketandcapitalist principles and rules vis-a-vis
fundamental human values, suchas, dignity, peace, freedomsolidarity and justice.
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most powerful economic agent on a world scale is the
transnational corporation. In the past decade there have been
some changes in terms of a greater internationalization ofproduction and globalization. The first process involves the
growing presence of transnationals in the international arena
in so far as they become even more important agents of
production, investment, trade, technological innovation and
financial transfers. Moreover, there has been a greater
competition on a world scale - globalization -, which has led to
agreater interaction amongtransnationalgroups through inter
alia fusions, acquisitions, and different mechanisms of
cooperation’®.
Offoremost importanceis to know the consequencesofthis
changing economic situation on the role of transnational
enterprises in Brazil.
3.1. A Brief Historical Record
Duringmore than four centuries Brazil had aprimary-export
economy. After the middle of the XVIIth century the country
becameintegrated into the British economic system through
the relation ofsemi-dependenceofPortugal on Great Britain. In
the colonial period all the decision-makingwas concentratedon
the commercial sector ofthe economy, whichwas controlled by
British and Portuguese enterprises. As has been argued,in the
period prior to political independence from Portugal in 1822,
“Brazil was a large plantation oftropical products, the colony
was closely integrated into and depended upon the European
economies. It was not, therefore, an autonomous system,inasmuchas itwasasimple extension ofotherlargersystems”,This integration persisted after the political independencefrom Portugal. Brazil could be considered as an unofficialmemberofthe British empire”. It is also worth noting thatjustafter independence in 1822, Portuguese and British firmsreceived privileged access to the Brazilian market, which wasmaintained until 1844,
In the second halfofthe XIXthcentury the Brazilian economyhad a prosperousphase, characterized by the predominance ofcoffee in the export activities and the developmentoftransport
17
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infrastructure and public utilities. In this period the dynamic
sector of the economywasstill foreign trade, which was to a
large extent controlled by British firms?!. Most of the
manufactured goods were imported, although there were some
local workshops and factories of consumer goods. The open-
doorspolicy involved a great presence of British firms, not only
in terms of foreign trade, but also through investments in
railways, shipping, insurance, portfacilities, banking, public
utilities as well as financial loans”. According to a British
observer, in 1878 “The Brazilian loans [were] entirely in the
handsof Messrs Rothschild”?°.
By 1914theBritish pre-eminencein Brazil was over.At the
same time, there had occurred the expansionofinvestments by
the United States since the turn ofthe century. The acceleration
of industrialization based on the import-substitution process
implied an intensification ofthe foreign presence through direct
investment, which in somecasesreceivedprivileged treatment”*.
In the initial industrialization spurts the foreign presence is
consolidated through assembly plants, service organizations,
sales offices and manufacturing plants*®. Although by the mid-
1930s there wererestrictions regarding the presenceof foreign
capital in somesectors, such as mining, petroleum and hydro-
electric energy, these restrictionswere due to reasonsofnational
security”®.
By the second andthird decade of the XXth century, firms
like General Electric, Nestlé, Pirelli, Ford, General Motors,
Chrysler, Rhone-Poulenc, British-American Tobacco, and
Siemens had already established production units, service
organizations or sales offices in Brazil. Hence, the spurts of
import- substitution industrialization during thefirst three
decades of the XXth century were accompanied by a flow of
foreign direct investment, which was not only welcomed, but
also received some governmentsupport. By and larg
capital was faced with a propitious andliberal envi
After the World War II some ofthe restrictions i
foreign capital during the 1930s - because of
strategic considerations -, were eliminated and
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transnational enterprises until the period ofpolitical turmoil of
early 1960s. The process ofimport-substitution industrialization
of the 1950s wasto a large extent centred on the expansion of
sectors controlled by transnational enterprises.
Soon after the coup d'etat in 1964, the military government
started to apply measuresin accordancewithan open-capitalist
economy and, by and large, the government implemented a
liberal policytowardsforeigncapital in general, and transnational
corporations in particular.
To illustrate,it is worth mentioning that, in addition to the
changesin the specific legislation onforeign capital, the Brazilian
military government aimed at encouraging newflowsof capital
and showing its goodwill towards transnational enterprises,
signed an investment guaranty agreement with the United
States government on February 1965. This agreement states
that, in the case of expropriation of US assets, which are
guaranteed by the US governmentand,therefore, are entitled
to compensation, the Brazilian government recognizes the
transfer of such assets to the US government. Hence, the
expropriation becomes an intergovernmental problem to be
resolvedin bilateral negotiations.
Indeed, as pointed out by a North-american expert on
Brazilian affairs, “special concessions were made to foreign
Private investors, who were regarded as an indispensable partof Brazil's future. The military regimes spent much time
renouncing the nationalist rethoric of the populist era that
Preceded them’?’,
3.2. The Strategic Role of Transnational Enterprises
Sincetheliberal reforms of 1964 carried outby the Brazilian
Military, the basic policies regarding foreign capital have notchanged in a significant way. In the context of a growing
€conomyfrom 1968 until 1980, transnational enterprises havePlayed a major role in the evolution of the Brazilian economyand the net flow of foreign direct investment have sharplyIncreasedin this period. However,since the debtcrisis there hasbeen a clear change inasmuchasthenetflow of foreign direct
19
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investment to Brazil has become growingly negative (annual
average transfers ofUS$ 1.1 billion since 1983)2°. It meansthat,
as regardsthenetflowsofforeign investment by transnational
corporations, Brazil has been a net exporterof capital.
Neverthless, Brazil is still one of the largest host economies
among developing countries. As a matteroffact, Singapore and
Brazil were the two largest host economies in the developing
world during the 1980s, with annual average inflows of US$
1.95 billion and US$ 1.85 billion respectively”. The total stock
of foreign direct investment registered at the Central Bank in
Brazil is about US$ 33 billion by the end of 1991.It is likely,
however, that the effective value of foreign capital controlled
directly by transnational corporations is well over US$ 50
billion.
The available dataalso showthattransnational corporations
are responsible for approximately 11% of total capital stock of
enterprises in Brazil (see Table 1). The United States is the
largest investor in Brazil (approximately one-fourth ofthe total
stock of foreign direct investment), followed by Germany,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, France and Japan. The
fragmentary empirical evidence does not seem to show a trend
of increasing participation of transnational corporationsin the
Brazilian economy during the past decade®. The main reason
for this phenomenonis, ofcourse, the sharp deterioration ofthe
internaleconomicand socialsituation, mainlyafterthe beginning
of the debt crisis in 1982, which has significantly reduced
investment opportunities and increased uncertainty.
The abovefindings abouttransnational enterprises in Brazil
are meaningless ifwe do not know the main characteristics of
foreign firms, their strategic position in the economy, and their
participation in dynamic sectors. It has to be noted in this
connection that about three-fourths of foreign investmentis
concentrated in manufacturing. Transnational corporations
accountfor 32% oftotal manufacturing production and 23% of
employment*'. Moreover, transnational corporations have a
significant participation in the production ofdurable consumer
goods, capital goods and intermediate products, and in these
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production respectively. Transnationals operations in Brazil
are carried outbymajority-owned andwhole-owned subsidiaries:
only8% ofmanufacturingproduction is accounted for minority-
ownedaffiliates. It is also worth noting that the activities of
transnational enterprises are very concentrated on technology-
intensive industries, as well as on industries where there is a
predominance of medium-size-to-large enterprises and large-
size enterprises™.
At issue is the extent to which transnationals control the
Brazilian economy.In this regard,it is worth pointing out that
Brazil has one of the highest degrees of internationalization of
production in the world. Only in a handful of countries
transnationals control domestic industries to the same extent
that they do in Brazil. To illustrate, let us compare the data on
the share of transnational enterprises in total manufacturing
sales and employmentin Brazil and in the United States (see
Table 2). In the former, transnationals accountfor 32% ofsales
andin the latter theyrepresent 11%. Moreover, a notable aspect
is that the degree ofopenness andinternationalization in Brazil
is higher thanin the USin all industries, except in printing and
publishing. This exception, which confirmstherule,isexplained
by the fact that publishing companies from Canada, United
Kingdom and Australia have significant investments in the US
SO as to take advantage of the English language market.
3.3. Transnational Enterprises and External Adjustment
The balance-of-payments problem ofBrazil during the 1980s
has beencharacterized by an extraordinary trade surplus (US$
100 billion in the period 1981-90) and by an enormousexternal
debtservice (US$ 110 billion in the same period). In this regard,
from a financial standpoint, the external debt was “paid” with
the trade superavit.
Transnational enterprises have played a significantrole in
the Brazilian foreign trade. From the late 1970s transnational
enterprises changedtheirtrade position, from deficit to superavit,
Owing to the sharp increaseoftheir exports as well as to the
€0vernment import controls. The data for the period 1978-86
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show annual average exports and imports by subsidiaries and
tes of transnationals in Brazil ofUS$ 5.7 billion and US$
3.0 billion, that is, an annual average superavit of US$ 2.7
billion, which corresponded to approximately 68% of Brazil's
trade superavit in the period**.
It is also worth noting that the available data for 1986
indicate that majority-owned subsidiaries in Brazil accounted
for 18% of total exports and 26% oftotal imports, whereas the
share of transnationals in total manufactured exports was28%, Ifone takes into account enterprises that are minority-
ownedaffiliates, the share of transnationals on manufactured
exports is approximately 40%°5,
It is important to point out that since the mid-1970s theforeign trade behaviourof transnational enterprises in Brazilwas characterized by the fact that they benefited from
extraordinary €xport incentives and subsidies. Exportpromotion
mechanisms have been extensively used from the early 1970s
until the late 1980s, especially during the military regime**. As
atmatter of fact, transnationals received special incentivesth ough mechanisms that were created so as to stimulate the©*P mn fon of their exports. On the basis of the availablepirical evidence, it can be said that the average subsidy/export ratio for transnationals was approximately 50%*’.leant G830teenationals received export subsidies of atforth on during the 1980s, that is, more than one-on orthe total external debt of Brazil.
halaaon to give a non-negligible contribution to the
transnationalehen: adjustment through trade surpluses,pone S Navealso played a majorrole in movingupwardsBrazil's pattern ofcomparative advantage. Given the enormous
incentives and subsidies given by the military governments andtheoverwhelmingpresence oftransnationalsinthe mostdynamic
sectors, theoutcomewasthattransnationalsbecame responsible
for a very significant share of exports of dynamicor tecnology-
intensive products and for the upgrading of Brazil's export
structure*®.
Moreover, the largest 53 exporters and importers among




The Brazilian Military, Foreign Indebtedness and Transnational Enterprises
manufactured exports and total imports**. There is no doubt
that these aspects represent important economic sources of
transnationals’ powerin Brazil.The extent towhichthe economic
and non-economic poweroftransnational enterprises in Brazil
is concentrated in a handful of enterprises is indicated by the
fact that the 25 largest subsidiaries are responsible for more
than 52% of the total sales of the 550 largest non-financial
transnationals in Brazil*®. As a matter of fact, transnational
enterprises have agreatnumberofeconomic and non-economic
sources of powerin a developing country like Brazil*’.
It is worth emphasizing that the trade performance of
transnationals in Brazil was to large extent determined by
policy measures implemented duringthe military regime. In the
early 1970s, before the first oil shock, the motivation of the
military regime to promote an outward-oriented model of
economic growth - based on rapid export expansion and deeper
penetration of transnational enterprises -, was determined by
economic, political and military-strategic factors.
Accordingto the traditionalview, export expansionhassome
importantdirectand indirecteffects in termsofforeignexchange,
productivity, technology transfer and so on. Moreover, the
outward-oriented model wasalso functional from a strategic-
Inilitary and political viewpoint.
It is hardly possible to overrate the influence of political,
military and strategic considerations. The reason for that was
the “threatofcommunism” argument.Aclosercooperationwith
theWest, mostlywith the hegemonic superpower, the USA, was
akey elementofthe strategy ofthe military regime from the very
first day after the coup d’état in March 1964. The investment
Suaranty agreementsigned exclusivelywith the USgovernment
in February 1965 is just one example. The closer cooperation
with the USA was important, for no other reason that the US
had a very important bearing on the coup d'état.
Thesituation started to changewiththe disequilibria caused
by the first oil shock in 1974. In the context of a deep
desequilibrium in the balance of payments, the policymakers,
military and technocrats alike, started to apply measures
aimingat reducing “external vulnerabilities”. As a result, they
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began to use an enormous and complex set of incentives and
subsidies to stimulate exports.In addition, there were important
tariff and non-tariff barriers, which meant a strong control of
imports, and these barrierswere alsoverypowerfulinstruments
to promote the structural reforms. That is, the external
disequilibrium of the second half of the 1970s and the debt
crisis of the 1980s were the main determinants of government
policies, which affected significantly the trade performance of
transnationals in Brazil.
3.4. Foreign Debt, Arms Production and Transnationals
The external shocks ofthe mid- 1970s and the strategies and
policies of adjustment adopted by the Brazilian military relied
to a large extent on export expansion. Brazilian export value
increased from less than US$
9
billion in 1975 to more thanUS$
20 billion in 1980. The strategy of incresing trade surpluses
became even more central to Brazilian policymakers after the
beginning of the debtcrisis.
In this regard, even though there were some important
political-military motivations for building up an arms industry
in Brazil, it is important to point out that one of the main
economic motivations behind establishing an arms industry
was the export promotion strategy*?. The strong outward-
looking bias of Brazil’s arms industry is shown by the fact that
between 80% and 95% oftotal production is exported. By mid-
1980s Brazil becamethefifth largest exporter in the world**.
Arms production in Brazil is to a very large extent the
outcome of a tripod strategy based on a close interaction
between the Brazilian government, private local groups and
transnational enterprises. The Brazilian military played a
catalytic role throughdifferentmechanims, such as,the mili
research and developmentinstitutes, the foreign trade and
financing agencies,the direct production ofmilitaryequipment,
and planning. With respect to the structure of the arms
industry, it is worth noting that there is high degree of
concentration in this industry inasmuch asthe three largest
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producers (one state-owned enterprise and two private l
ocal
enterprises) account for about 90% of total arms
exports.
Nevertheless, there is no doubtthattransnational enterp
rises
play a majorrole in the Brazil's arms industry. According toa
recent study, 159 subsidiaries oftransnationals are in
volved in
arms production in Brazil**. By and large, transnational
s
produce both civilian and military products. To ill
ustrate,
Mercedes Benz and General Motors supply engines, par
ts and
components to Brazilian manufacturer of military vehicl
es.
Transnationals have also joint ventures with state-owne
d
enterprises and private local groups. This is the case of
Volkswagen and Phillips. Moreover, transnationalshave played
a majorrole in the developmentof the Brazil's arms industry
through licensing agreements and technical assistance. For
instance, the largest arms producer in Germany (MBB) and the
Italian Aermacchi had licensing agreements related to the
production of training jets and missiles, respectively. The
Swedish transnational enterprise, Ericsson, had a licensing
agreementrelated to the production ofradars by its subsidiary
in Brazil**.
It is also worth emphasizing that the supply,by subsidiaries
of transnational enterprises, of parts, components and inputs
to the local private and public enterprises is a fundamental
feature of the Brazilian arms industry. This phenomenonis
largely explained by the existenceofa relatively diversified and
complex industrial sector in Brazil as well as the dominantrole
oftransnationals in the technology-intensive industries.In this
regard, it is also worthwhile noting that North-american
transnationals are the most important suppliers.
With respect to the transfer of military-related technology,
the majorrole is played by European transnationals. Here, the
military considerationshave had an overwhelminginfluence,in
Part because of the strategy of the Brazilian military aiming at
reducing the country’s dependence on the United States and,in
part, as aresultofthe restrictions imposedbytheUSgovernment
on the access to their military-related technology (what the
Brazilian military call “technology apartheid’).
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4. Conclusions
The strategies and policies of the Brazilian military areclosely linked to the external indebtedness process and theinternal and external disequilibria, which are affecting thecountry since the 1970s. Here, the pointis that the close linksbetween the Brazilian military and foreign indebtednessare notso muchrelated to military expenditures, but mainly to theinfluence of military conceptions, visions and projects aboutStrategies and geopolitics on the process of external and
structural adjustment. There was a strong military-strategiccomponent in the process of adjustment. In this regard, theinfluence and responsibility of the Brazilian military go beyondtheir immediate capacity to increase military expenditures andCarry out mega-projects, such as, the nuclear programme.Moreover, the adjustmentprocesses undertaken byboth themilitary and civil regimes, have followed the line of leastresistance in sofar as they relied on an even deeperinsertion inthe world economy through counter-productive mechanisms.In this regard, the adjustment policies and strategies havestrongly relied on transnational enterprises’ investment andtrade behaviour and on international financial flows as well,Moreover, the links between the Brazilian military, the externaladjustmentand transnationals have been important inso farasthe building up of one of the largest arms industries in the
influenced by the need to generate ifore gn exchange - so as topay the debt service and Carry out the balance-of-payments
adjustment. In Brazil the arms industry relies significantly ontransnational enterprises’ production and technology.Indeed, the Brazilian elites in general, and the military in
particular, have adopted a strategy on the basis of theline ofleast resistance, which involved the convergence of “the all-consuming desire for profits” of the large domestic groups andtransnationals and “the all-overwhelmingdesire forsecurity”ofthe military establishment. As a result, the country has had aprocess of maladjustment so that the social and economicdisequilibria are increasing.
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teworthy issueis that the processesofstructural
reformsandadjustment, underthe initiative and responsibility
of Brazilian military, have backfired in so far as they increased
the country’s external vulnerability. Indeed, the strategy of
reducing external dependence and vulnerability, which is
fundamental for the military establishment, wasa complete
failure. Nowadays, Brazil has a pattern of insertion into the
world economic system which implies not only an important
degree of dependence, but a great external vulnerability in
terms oftechnological, trade, and financial flows, as well asan
extraordinary degree of internationalization of its production
system because of the significant presence of transnational
enterprises. Bythe end ofthe 1980sthefailure ofthe adjustment
process hasimplied interaliaa greater outflow offoreign capital
capital and nearly the bankruptcy of the Brazilian arms
industry*®.
TheYellor administration which started in March 1990
carried outa series of policy reforms aiming at an even deeper
promotion of market forces and capitalist principles in the
country. Hence, the governmentputforwardpolicies to promote
the market mechanism through, for instance, the greater
openness of the economy, deregulamentation, and
“denationalization”or“privatization”ofpublic-owned enterprises.
So far, this newset ofneo-liberal policies in Brazilhas increased
further the social and economic disequilibria, whereas the
macroeconomic stabilization seems to be far-away (inflation
rates have been over 20% monthly during thefirst five months
of 1992) andtherecessionis in its third consecutive year.
The mostbasic feature of this perverse situation is that the
foreign debtcrisis is still a critical problem in Brazil, and the
Collor government, despite its clear neo-liberal initiatives, was
able to sign an agreementwith the international private banks
Since it came to power more than two years ago (March 1992).
Just a few weeks before ofthe fall of the Collor governmentin
late September 1992, the Ministry of Finance wasin a hurry to
Negotiate a term sheet with foreign banks.
In the contextofa crisis ofgovernment credibility in the last
0 years, transnational enterprises have increased their
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pressures and exercising extraordinary powerso as to get amore favourable treatment, including changes in the 1988Constitution.
Moreover,it is worth noting that, despite the liberal policies,the Collor government was considered by the executives oftransnational enterprises the most inefficient and corruptgovernmentin Latin America and the Caribbean by the end of19914”. Asa matter offact, the political-economic processin therecent past has been influenced by the so-called “CollorPolynomial”, that is, the administration ofPresident FernandoCollor was characterized by five “variables” (1) the “bizarre”personality ofPresident Collor*®: (2) the authoritarian behaviourand conduct of Collor*®; (3) the lack of political and ideologicalconsistencyofgovernment™;(4) the persistent fallofcredibility>';
and (5) the permanentrisk of non-governance®?,
of the past three years as a res
and growing concern for natio
independent foreign Policy and
the economy). The recent expe
ult, apparently, of low salaries
nal defense (probably, a more
lower external vulnerability of
riences of a coup d'état in Peru
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TABLE1:
The relative importanceof foreign capital in Brazil, according to the
sector: 1977 and 1985
 
Sector\ The percentage share of foreign capital





Nonmetallic mineral] products 11.8 11.4
Metallurgy - 15.1 13.7
Nonelectrical machinery 36.9 36.2
Electrical machinery 53.9 40.2
Transport equipment 51.8 50.6






Pharmaceutical products 70.2 67.7
Perfumery 48.3 34.7
Plastic products 10.2 13.1
Textiles 17.3 16.2
Clothing and shoes 2.9 3.3
Food products 11.9 11.5
Beverages 6.3 4.6
Tobacco 30.5 52.6
Printing and publishing 3.1 5.0
Miscellaneous 24.4 50.7Construction 3.0 2.2Public utilities
2.8 oneServices 4.7 6.9Transportation 0.3 0.2Communication ons eee
Lodging and catering 7.0 1.6
Repair and maintenance 13.5 8.6
Personal services 0.7 6.8Commercial services 16.1 12.7
Entertainment 1.6 4.2
Finance 2.4 6.2Wholesale trade 23.7 22.2Retail trade 2.1 3.7Real estate 5.4 9.2Unspecified
44.0 15.8TOTAL
11.1 11.0
Source: Author's co: - -
m 7 ;Fiscal 1979 and reaations on the basis of Finance Ministry, Brazil. Anuario Econémico
Note: (...) Less than 0.05 percent.
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TABLE 2:
The Relative Importance of Transnational Enterprises in
Manufacturing: Brazil and United States
The percentage share of transnational enterprises
 
Sector\ Sales Employment
Brazil USA Brazil USA
Nonmetallic mineral products 23 22 12 12
Metallurgy 16 13 19 7
Nonelectrical machinery 34 6 25 6Electrical machinery 83 12 68 9
Transport equipment 78 3 81 3
Paper 13 7 11 6
Rubberandplastic products 38 10 31 7
Chemicals andallied products 44 31 63 24
Textiles 16 4 13 3
Food products, beverages, tobacco 23 8 14 9
Printing and publishing l 8 1 5
Miscellaneous 7 6 5 4
Total
32 1] 23 7
 
Sources and notes: Author's computations based
Gongalves, “La presencia de las empresas transnaci
Informes de la CEPAL, Santiago, No. 31, 1983, p. 66-
companies: 1987 benchmark survey results", Su
on data found in Reinaldo
onales en Brasil", Estudios e
7, and “U.S. affillates of foreign
rvey of Current Business, Vol. 69,No. 7, 1989, p. 130-1. The data for Brazil refer to 1977 and for the USAto 1987.
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